Amid the current regional security threats and global transformations, dialogues between nations gain significance as they aim to shed light on the partnerships achieved among countries and the prominent challenges they face. Hence, the importance of the dialogue organized by the Public Policy Research Center in India, in collaboration with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in Kochi, Kerala, India, under the slogan “India’s Policy Towards the West: People, Prosperity, and Progress,” on January 16-17, 2025. The author of these lines participated in this dialogue, which included an elite group of officials from both sides, notably Mr. Jassim Mohammed Al-Budaiwi, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and several ambassadors of GCC countries in India, alongside Indian officials and researchers, with significant attendance from various institutions in the Gulf and India.

The dialogue gained importance from several aspects, including the unique historical relationship between the Gulf countries and India, influenced by trade movements through different eras, as well as developmental dimensions. The Indian workforce is the largest foreign community in the Gulf, exceeding 9 million workers in various professions, including medicine, nursing, technology, banking, and investment companies. Moreover, some Indian families, especially investors, have moved to settle in the GCC countries. The trade exchange between India and the Gulf reached about $174.2 billion in 2022, representing about 11.3% of the total trade volume of the Gulf countries, as mentioned by the Secretary-General in his opening speech, in addition to cooperation in the energy sector.

Despite the multiple partnerships of the GCC countries with various Western and Asian powers, some are bilateral, while others are through the GCC as a regional organization. The partnership with India takes both paths. Notably, the high-level participation of the Secretary-General of the Council, who delivered a speech described as a roadmap for the future of the partnership between the two sides, outlining the pillars of Gulf-Indian relations, the reality of those relations, and the priorities for the future path of that partnership. In my estimation, it was characterized by frankness and clarity, with the GCC countries’ desire to develop that partnership through the GCC as an organization, based on significant steps, including the first ministerial meeting between the GCC countries and India in 2022 and the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the GCC and India, which included cooperation in various fields, followed by an agreement on a joint action plan between the two sides for the period 2024-2028, both important frameworks for that partnership.

The dialogue also included rich discussions on five axes: first, trade, economy, and investments; second, energy and innovation; third, healthcare, education, and technology; fourth, people, prosperity, and progress; and fifth, the strategic partnership between India and the Gulf in maritime security.

There were many details during the discussions on these axes, characterized by transparency, which is important because a true partnership is built on a clear commitment from both sides and includes the priorities of both parties, with the most important being the institutionalization of that partnership within sustainable frameworks, whether agreements or memoranda of understanding, and setting short-term and long-term goals to be worked on by both sides.

Analyzing these discussions, five key observations can be made: first, despite the significant progress in trade, economy, and investments, there are still ambitions for both sides, including signing more agreements, especially in the field of double taxation to cover all GCC countries, and accelerating the establishment of a free trade area between India and the Gulf, given the multiplicity and intertwining of economic and commercial interests; second, cooperation in energy and innovation should go beyond fossil fuels, with GCC countries moving towards clean energy to achieve carbon neutrality according to specific plans, and India’s expertise in this field can be utilized, linked to the concept of energy security in general and the priorities of both sides; third, despite the fruits of cooperation between the GCC countries and India in healthcare, technology, and education, some challenges facing the development of that cooperation were raised, with both sides affirming their determination to find effective solutions that meet the needs of both parties; fourth, the societal dimensions of the partnership between the two sides, despite the huge number of the Indian community in the Gulf, India does not have soft power institutions, such as centers for teaching the Indian language, similar to what China and Japan have done in the GCC countries, aiming to introduce more aspects of Indian society in general; and fifth, the debate on India’s role in maritime security, as the dialogue included many interventions from the Indian side about India’s efforts in maintaining maritime security, including combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and training naval forces in various parts of the world on coastal protection, which amounted to 27 operations in one year, some of which were with GCC countries, and the development of the shipbuilding industry in India, where ships are manufactured locally, all indicators that GCC countries can benefit from, but the interventions of GCC researchers focused on a comprehensive vision for maritime security, emphasizing the need for India’s contribution to resolving regional conflicts that are a major cause of maritime security threats, in addition to the threat of armed militias to maritime security, and the fundamental question is about the added value that India can provide to GCC countries in the field of maritime security, given the nature of the challenges facing GCC countries in this field, including capacity building, dealing with maritime disasters, and achieving a balance of power in maritime capabilities with regional parties, without denying the existence of important indicators about India’s role in the security and defense fields for GCC countries in general, including the signing of a memorandum of understanding for defense cooperation with Kuwait in December 2024 during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kuwait, in addition to the periodic visits of Indian ships to Gulf ports over the last decade.

The first dialogue between the GCC countries and India, which included officials and researchers, was an important opportunity for extensive discussions characterized by seriousness, reflecting the conviction of both sides that the partnership between them is a strategic goal.

I have referred in several previous articles to the threats to maritime security in the Arabian Gulf states, each linked to a specific event. However, the persistent question remains: despite regional and international efforts to address these threats, they continue to exist and even escalate. This occurs in a time when the global reliance on maritime transport for international trade has increased by up to 400% in recent years. So, what are the challenges in addressing these threats, especially given the vital dependence of the Arabian Gulf states on maritime corridors for global trade? These states are classified as maritime nations due to their strategic location and proximity to two of the world’s most important maritime passages, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Initially, by analyzing the nature of maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf region from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s to the current situation in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, it becomes clear that maritime security is not the direct cause of regional conflicts but rather a card employed by parties with naval influence and power. These parties recognize the strategic importance of this card in conflicts. It serves as a touchpoint between regional and global security. Numerous examples demonstrate this, such as maritime security threats being the primary reason for the establishment of international coalitions.

One critical point to emphasize is that maritime security threats result from intense and unprecedented regional conflicts, pushing the parties involved to extend their disputes into the seas. These waters become genuine arenas to test the balance of power among conflicting parties. This highlights the notion that there can be no maritime security without fundamentally resolving regional conflicts. While military alliances are important for deterrence, their impact is tied to their specific missions. Maritime security threats, however, are continuous.

Additionally, another pressing issue is the resolution of maritime boundary disputes, especially when these borders encompass resources like oil or hold strategic importance. Such disputes often lay the groundwork for broader conflicts. Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) provides a legal framework agreed upon by nations, the lack of adherence to its provisions remains a challenge to achieving maritime security. The implementation of these provisions largely depends on the naval capabilities of nations, particularly those with maritime boundary disputes with neighbors.

Moreover, the technological advancements, especially in artificial intelligence, have profoundly influenced maritime security threats. The major challenge lies in how non-state actors exploit these technologies to threaten maritime security, causing significant damage with minimal cost. For instance, the use of advanced drones by non-state actors, such as the Houthi group, poses a significant threat. History is replete with examples, from the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden to the recent thwarted attempts to use underwater drones.

Finally, instead of seas being areas of cooperation among nations, particularly in maritime security where interests often align, they have increasingly become arenas of competition and conflict. Despite many countries, including major powers, issuing independent maritime security strategies—previously included within their broader national security strategies—these strategies reflect competition rather than collaboration in maritime security. This underscores that the role of major powers in ensuring maritime security is influenced by global competition and conflicts in various maritime regions.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej

Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow