Discussions and endless debates about regional security have long been raised. This is not a new concept—it is embodied in organizations around the world such as ASEAN, the European Union, NATO, the African Union, and regionally by the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, when this debate arises concerning the Arabian Gulf region, it is not generalized but rather extends to the very definitions of the terms “security” and “region.”
The concept of security is closely tied to the developments the Arabian Gulf has witnessed—especially since the establishment of the GCC in 1981 as a security initiative among countries bound by shared ties, facing regional security threats. Thus, the term “security” is viewed according to the interests and needs of the involved parties. Gulf security has been expressed through the GCC alongside strategic partnerships with major Western powers, exemplified in security agreements renewed after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.
The term “region,” on the other hand, carries another dimension. The Gulf states exist within a broader region that includes others with different political systems and security visions, such as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Despite differing security policies, all these states share the same geographic space. The pressing question is: Can these differing visions converge to establish at least a sustainable regional dialogue on regional security threats?
Traditionally, the answer has been that the region hosts multiple security systems, which is natural. However, recent security developments in the region have unequivocally affirmed that regional dialogue is essential for achieving regional security. This does not necessarily mean forming a rigid security structure akin to other global examples, particularly in light of conflicting interests and historical experiences that have fostered distrust among regional actors.
Several visions have been proposed, including the GCC’s 2023 vision for regional security, which focused more on the content and priorities of security rather than the mechanisms to implement it. Its importance lies in two things: first, it was issued collectively by the GCC as an organization, and second, it outlined future security priorities for Gulf states. Additionally, other regional actors have presented their own visions of regional security.
Despite the value of these initiatives, a persistent question remains: Can we speak of Gulf security without considering the interests of major global powers? Beyond the familiar oil-for-security equation, the region hosts strategic waterways crucial for global maritime navigation, in addition to the economic and commercial interests of those powers—such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative or the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
This indicates that the concept of security now extends beyond its traditional military dimension to include economic and strategic presence of non-Western powers as well.
To date, Western initiatives for Gulf security have largely focused on military security, expressed through bilateral security agreements and continued alliance-building against perceived regional threats. These have been aimed at individual Gulf states rather than the GCC as a collective entity, such as NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Conversely, although presented in more inclusive formats, Russian (2019), Chinese (2021), and European (2022) security initiatives for the Gulf have not laid out clear plans for a regional security framework. These initiatives have either remained vague or tied the Gulf to broader geographies like the Middle East, with limited focus on the true scope of security needs compared to other economic priorities.
Still, these initiatives underscore an important fact: it is very difficult to establish a regional security structure without considering the interests of international stakeholders in the region.
Returning to the initial point, despite some encouraging indicators—such as the GCC’s 2023 security vision, the collective Gulf effort to support Syria in a new phase, the reconciliation approaches between some Gulf states and Iran, and the deepening of Gulf-Iraqi relations—these efforts need to coalesce into an inclusive regional dialogue involving all relevant countries, including Yemen, which is in dire need of state-building.
While the Gaza conflict has impacted regional priorities and efforts—most of which are currently focused on resolving that prolonged crisis—this should not prevent the pursuit of a wider regional dialogue. Gulf states maintain a unified vision of regional security threats and related priorities, which can shape their role in this dialogue. Iran, Iraq, and Yemen will undoubtedly have different perspectives, but the issue is not one of competing agendas as much as it is about building trust and aligning around shared priorities. This calls for significant measures and steps, and a focus on cooperation in areas like maritime security, food security, cyber threats, and broader economic and commercial partnerships.
Creating a regional security framework is not impossible, but it depends foremost on trust-building, resolving longstanding disputes, and institutionalizing a lasting dialogue with strategic goals, aiming to move away from military-dominated approaches—which have long defined regional and international engagement in Gulf security—toward a cooperative security model.
This does not mean that any of the global models mentioned earlier are ideal for the Gulf—because regional security is context-specific, shaped by the unique interests of its members. The strength and cohesion of these actors will define the reality of Gulf security, which remains a shared ambition for the region amid a rapidly shifting international power landscape.
Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.
Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej
Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow