After a period of tension and back-and-forth between the U.S. administration and Iran over urging the latter to sign a new nuclear agreement that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programs are not diverted to military purposes, media outlets reported that U.S. President Donald Trump sent a message to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 12, 2025. The message was delivered via Dr. Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates, who handed it over to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. As is usual with such significant messages, the full contents were not publicly disclosed, but leaks indicated that the message gave Iran a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement, or else face other consequences that, in Trump’s words to an American TV station, would ‘solve the problem.’
Even before receiving the message, Iran’s response was clear, as voiced by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who said: “They are making new demands that Iran will not accept, such as our defensive capabilities, missile range, regional influence, and restrictions on who we can engage with.” This statement reflects the essence of the real issue, and it is particularly relevant to the Gulf states. The U.S. administration made a wise decision by conveying the message through a Gulf official, as these states have long called to be part of the negotiations. They are directly concerned with the nuclear issue, whether resolved peacefully through a new agreement or through other, non-peaceful options.
However, the Iranian issue cannot be confined solely to nuclear programs. There is Iran’s conventional armament and the broader regional situation. Solving the nuclear issue does not mean ending regional instability. While Gulf states have indeed started a reconciliatory path with Iran—such as the 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Bahrain’s positive statements about resuming relations—this is only a small step. There are still unresolved issues such as border disputes between Iran and some Gulf states, differing views on Gulf security and the naming of the Arabian Gulf, and ongoing regional conflicts. All of these must be addressed before discussing true regional stability.
Gulf state policies have generally not sought hostile relations with Iran. They have often prioritized geography over politics. But the region’s instability has made it difficult for Gulf countries to remain neutral regarding regional security crises.
Returning to the central point, and while it is important that Gulf states be included in these negotiations, the pressing question remains: What are Iran’s options in responding to Trump’s message? Especially given reports that Trump stated he does not want prolonged negotiations, but a deal within two months.
In light of current regional chaos and global shifts reflecting a new American strategic approach—one more reliant on military force than diplomatic solutions—Iran has two options.
The first is to enter negotiations focusing solely on the nuclear program, which Iran insists is peaceful and strategic. The challenge, however, lies in achieving such an agreement within the two-month window Trump outlined. Iran’s past strategy relied on “buying time,” but the question is: can a deal be reached strictly about the nuclear issue without touching on regional concerns? Especially amid current regional developments such as events in Gaza and Syria and U.S. strikes on the Houthis, where Trump blamed Iran for the attacks.
This brings us to the second option: Iran refusing to negotiate, which raises the possibility of alternative scenarios. While I remain among those who rule out a military strike on Iran for many reasons—not least because if the goal is to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, do U.S. intelligence services even know with certainty where all components are? The program involves not just facilities, but scientists and enriched uranium stockpiles. What guarantees are there that a strike would completely dismantle the program? More importantly, what would Iran’s response be? This recalls a warning from a previous U.S. administration that “Iran is within U.S. firepower,” to which Iran responded that “American interests in the region are too,” raising the question: who is threatening whom? And notably, the Biden administration had a clear opportunity to strike these facilities during confrontations between Iran and Israel.
Beyond both scenarios, regional influence remains a crucial factor in any future negotiations, along with the impact of all possible options on Gulf countries. There is ongoing debate about Iran’s current strengths and weaknesses. While Iran’s regional influence is undeniably affected by the declining role of Hezbollah, developments in Gaza and Syria, and the impact of strikes on the Houthis, Iran still holds cards of power. It is a maritime nation capable of significantly threatening and disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab—as we are currently witnessing. Additionally, the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear and conventional arms programs remains, along with its advances in military technology.
Despite sanctions, Iran has become a manufacturer and exporter of drones. It is also working to leverage global shifts that clearly benefit Iran—such as divisions between the U.S. and its European allies, and Washington’s shifting focus away from the Middle East. This has given China and Russia opportunities to exploit the gaps left by U.S. policy.
In light of this situation, Gulf states must send a unified message to both parties—that they must be included in the negotiations, not just act as intermediaries. They must also work to prevent non-diplomatic paths from being taken, since these would place them before extremely complex choices. Especially now, when national security threats no longer come solely from traditional wars but also through modern technology. There are also growing concerns about the consequences of any confrontation on vital infrastructure in the Gulf, making a collective Gulf role in dealing with both parties to the conflict all the more essential.
Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.
Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej
Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow