Throughout its history, the Arabian Gulf region has received—and continues to receive—initiatives and strategies for Gulf security, whether from major powers or organizations with vital interests in this critical area of the world. Many researchers have consistently linked these initiatives to the region’s oil significance, which is largely accurate. The military alliances led by the United States in the region were often prompted by threats to oil, whether in production areas or maritime transport routes, such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the southern Red Sea.

Others argue that Gulf states, often classified as small and medium-sized states, have opted for security partnerships with major powers and influential global organizations. Accordingly, the initiatives of these powers fit within this framework. Amid debates over what international actors have provided to the region in terms of security support—whether during crises or through partnerships aimed at strengthening the Gulf states’ military capabilities—questions arise about the Gulf states’ own security project.

This does not refer to the well-known frameworks of security and defense integration, which are evolving on various levels, but specifically to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) security initiative. This initiative first emerged in March 2024 when Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi announced a vision for regional security. In my view, this marked a significant starting point in this direction, as it addresses a contentious issue for many Western scholars. These scholars have frequently debated the collective Gulf vision for Gulf security, often pointing to the absence of explicit references to security and defense integration in the GCC’s founding charter.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej