On July 2, 2024, media outlets reported on the visit by Prince Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi Minister of Defense, to Turkey, where he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presence of Turkish Defense Minister Yashar Guler. This visit was part of mutual steps to enhance relations between Turkey and some Gulf States, a trend that has accelerated in recent years, particularly through meetings between Gulf and Turkish officials during 2022 and 2023. These visits carry significant implications both in their substance and timing, going beyond the scope of bilateral agreements. While economic agreements signed between the two sides are important, the establishment of high-level strategic committees indicates a shared desire to institutionalize these relations and maintain their continuity, free from potential tensions.

This shift is not unilateral; in March 2024, a free trade agreement was signed between Turkey and the Gulf States to initiate negotiations. I believe these measures reflect the rapidly advancing nature of these relationships. Turkey remains a key destination for millions of tourists from the Gulf States, while political relations are also progressing through regular strategic dialogues between Turkey and the Gulf, with Qatar hosting the sixth round in June 2024. Notably, Turkish President Erdoğan participated in the 44th Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Doha in 2023, where he emphasized that “Turkish-Gulf relations continue to grow, with trade between the two sides reaching $23 billion.” Beyond these figures, this partnership is likely to expand further through the integration of technology and capital. Turkey’s military technology expertise and the Gulf’s financial resources provide a foundation for military cooperation, especially given Saudi Arabia’s goal to localize military industries as part of its sustainable development plan, along with shared perspectives on common challenges.

This alignment will likely impact three key areas: 1) regional balance, with Turkey as an influential regional power and the second-largest army in NATO after the United States. Although these growing ties do not target alliance-building, they reflect strategic partnerships at a time when the Gulf is simultaneously improving relations with Iran, suggesting collaborative regional frameworks bolstering security; 2) the effect on regional issues such as Syria and Iraq, as Turkey and the Gulf have seen positive shifts in relations with these nations, fostering a unified vision for regional security; and 3) coordination in areas of strategic presence, such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa, where both sides’ interests align, and Turkey, along with some Gulf countries, maintains military bases in the Horn of Africa.

However, I do not align with analysts who suggest that Turkey could serve as a mediator between the Gulf and Western nations or utilize these relations to benefit the Gulf. There are three main reasons: 1) some Gulf States have direct relations with NATO through the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, in which Turkey is also a member; 2) the Gulf’s relationships with Western countries remain strategic, even amid occasional differences, without escalating into severe conflicts; and 3) Turkey itself has disputes with certain Western NATO allies.

From a strategic perspective, the development of these relations since late 2020, along with positive indicators between the Gulf States and Iran, recalls a proposal by former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa at an Arab summit. He suggested forming a ‘League of Arab Neighboring States’ comprising Arab League members, Turkey, Iran, and some African countries. This proposal saw varied reactions from Arab countries at the time, but Moussa justified it by stating that the ‘League would be based on common interests and security coordination across member states,’ underscoring that shared challenges demand institutional cooperation that transcends conflict and rivalry amid a rapidly changing regional and global landscape.

While the previous steps toward rapprochement between the two sides are indeed significant, driven by what could be termed a ‘mutual strategic necessity,’ there remain important areas that continue to be of interest to the Gulf States. One such area is Turkey’s use of soft power through its drama productions, which attract millions of viewers in the Arab world—an experience that deserves study and potential adaptation, especially for the Gulf States, as smaller and medium-sized countries for which soft power is a valuable tool. Additionally, relations between both the Gulf States and Russia have witnessed notable developments, particularly with China and Russia, a dynamic important for managing international competition in the Gulf region and the Middle East.

In summary, this interweaving of interests reaffirms a point I’ve previously made in past articles: Amidst the uncertainty surrounding global power shifts and the intensifying security threats—largely driven by technological advances reducing the reliance on quantitative armament and the increased activity of non-state armed groups—regional cooperation and coordination have become an urgent necessity, whether through consistent engagement across all sectors, strategic dialogues, or the establishment of other collaborative forums. All these avenues lead to a single outcome: regional security threats have become indivisible, and the only way to address them is through coordination and the integration of efforts, which only require decisions to promote their continuity and institutionalization. There are various models of dialogue between regional organizations and neighboring countries, some or all of which could be suitable for a future relationship between Turkey and the Gulf States.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej

Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow